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Summary of the Law of Building
and Use Restrictions*
CREATION OF RESTRICTIONS
Restrictions upon the use of land, and also those restraints upon alienation commonly associated with them under the common title of "building and use restrictions," may
be created as possibilities of reverter limiting base fees;
as conditions subsequent imposed upon estates in fee; as
covenants real; as equitable servitudes; and in one or two
instances only, as easements.
AS POSSIBILITIES OF REVERTER
The possibility of reverter is seldom or never used to
create restrictions, probably because it results in automatic
forfeiture if the restriction is violated.
AS CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT
Attempts to use the condition subsequent are not infrequent, but many restrictions created in this form would,
if passed upon, be construed as mere covenants; because
the courts are hostile to conditions subsequent, do not recognize them unless the purpose to create them appears
unmistakably, and, except perhaps in connection with restrictions directed against race, try to find reasons for refusing to enforce them.
This is not to say, however, that every condition subsequent is also a covenant; it is not one unless there has
been an undertaking to perform the condition, which may
not be the case.
The reason for the hostility of the courts to conditions
subsequent is that, except when enforcement proceedings
have been too long delayed, violation of the condition works
*From the Law of Building and Use Restrictions. Reprinted with
special permission of the author and the publishers, Clark Boardman
Company, Ltd., New York. Copyrighted 1928.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
a forfeiture at the will of the person entitled to enforce it.
Equity abhors a forfeiture, and in Pennsylvania at least,
equitable principles control actions to enforce a forfeiture
for breach of condition subsequent.
At least unless provision to the contrary is made in the
restrictive instrument, the only persons entitled to enforce
a forfeiture for breach of condition subsequent are the
heirs at law of the grantor of the estate which is subject
to the condition, notwithstanding that the title to the dominant estate may have passed the others. At common law
these heirs took by descent, and descent to them was the
only way in which the right of forfeiture, known as a right
of entry, could be transferred. It has been held in Pennsylvania, however, that if the right of entry has been reserved
to the grantor and his assigns by the restrictive instrument,
it will become available to assigns when the grantor aliens;
in fact, that it will pass to a purchaser at execution sale.
If the restrictive instrument mentions assigns, presumably
the right is devisable as well as alienable inter vivos, though
'assigns' might be held not to include devisees.
AS COVENANTS REAL
The limits of the class of covenants real, or covenants
running with the land, as they are more often called, are
uncertain, but it is probable that in Pennsylvania the class
includes all "building and use" restrictions created by formal instrument. Another uncertainty is whether these
covenants bind assigns of a covenantor irrespective of notice. Text writers seem to assume that they do, but there
is reason to think that today the contrary might be held.
The latter view is desirable, as removing a cause of hardship and assimilating the rules governing covenants real
to those governing equitable servitudes. Covenants real
can be created only by an instrument under seal, but, anomalously, it has been held that the signature and seal need
not to be those of the covenantor; if he accepts the instrument that is enough. Probably this is the law in Pennsylvania. Certainly it is common practice there to treat re-
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strictions as effective although the covenantor may not
have signed the deed; he seldom does, when he is the grantee. •There is no risk in this practice apart from the possible application of the Statute of Frauds, to be mentioned
later, for the restriction will be effective as an equitable
servitude it not as a covenant real. But the desired covenant should be incorporated in the instrument of grant, and
not in a separate instrument, even one executed contemporaneously. There are decisions, including two in Pennsylvania, recognizing covenants real which were not set
forth in deeds of conveyance, but unless covenants real
bind assigns irrespective of notice, there is the danger that
they will not be effective against an assign of the covenantor having no actual knowledge of their existence. Putting
such covenants on record will not necessarily give notice,
for it has been held that the search need be only against the
title, and not against grantor apart from the title.
AS EASEMENTS
The only building and use restrictions which can be
said with any certainty to be easements are those providing for access and those concerning windows. This fact is
not important, because easements created by instruments
under seal are also covenants real.
AS EQUITABLE SERVITUDES
Equitable servitudes are those accessorial rights in land
which are not technically covenants real, easements, or profits a prendre, and which are enforceable only in equity. If,
as suggested above, covenants real include in Pennsylvania
all 'building and use' restrictions created by formal instrument, equitable servitudes include only restrictions created
orally or by instrument not under seal. It is a question,
however, whether the Statute of Frauds permits the creation of restrictions by oral agreement. If it does not, then
the only restrictions which are equitable servitudes are
those created by writing signed by the party to be charged
but not under seal. This makes the class of equitable ser-

DICKIN5 ON LAW REVIEW
vitudes so narrow that it is well to explain that the law of
equitable servitudes arose in England, where the class of
covenants real is much more limited than it is in Pennsylvania and in most jurisdictions in the United States.
Equitable servitudes depend upon notice. If any assign of a covenantor takes without notice of the restriction,
it is at an end. Questions of notice seldom arise in connection with restrictions, because it is held that if the restrictions appear in any duly recorded instrument in the chain
of title, that is notice; but when they do arise they are vital.
ENFORCEMENT IN GENERAL
The enforcement of restrictions is almost invariably
Prohibition rather than compensation is
by injunction.
the purpose of most persons who are entitled to the benefit of a restriction; money damages for a violation are difficult to estimate; and most restrictions are created as covenants real or as equitable servitudes rather than as possibilities of reverter or as conditions subsequent. A possibility of reverter cannot be enforced by injunction; in this respect it is like a remainder interest following a life estate;
when the event-that is, the violation of the restrictionoccurs, the servient estate simply terminates. A breaclof
condition subsequent gives a right of entry, not a contract
right, and rights of entry are not enforceable by injunction;
however, most conditions subsequent are accompanied by
a covenant which can be enforced as such without making
use of the right of entry.
SCOPE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Injunctions may prevent a proposed violation of any
kind; order the cessation of a forbidden use of a permitted
structure; require the demolition of a forbidden structure,
or the restoration of one unlawfully destroyed or removed;
or even compel a defendant to initiate the action required
by the restriction.
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DISCRETION
Although none of the recognized defenses to enforcement mentioned below may be present, the court may refuse an injunction if under all the circumstances it seems
undesirable to grant one. When an injunction is thus denied the denial is an exercise of discretion. It is incorrect
to say that injunctive relief is always a matter of discretion, for if no special circumstances are present, an injunction is a matter of right when a violation is proved and no
standard defense appears. It is however correct to say
that injunctive relief, like any other relief, is always dependent upon the view which the court may take of the
facts, and that the facts may warrant the exercise of discretion rather than the application of a rule. In other
words, injunctive relief is not always a matter of discretion
but is always subject to the possibility of the exercise of
discretion.
DEFENSE IN GENERAL-ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF
THE PARTIES OR OF THEIR PREDECESSORS
For convenience, defenses to the enforcement of restrictions may be grouped into these divisions:
First, defenses based on the acts or omissions of the
parties or of their predecessors. These are the defenses of
merger, release, inaction, and of violations by plaintiff.
Merger and release need no special comment here. Violations by plaintiff or by his predecessors in title bar an injunction against a violation no more extensive than plaintiff's, but not an injunction against a more extensive violation. Inaction is a bar if it has occurred after plaintiff
knew of the violation and there has been intervening action
by defendant which would make him worse off, if an injunction were granted, than he would have been if the application to the court had been made as soon as plaintiff knew of
the violation; or perhaps, apart from actual knowledge by
plaintiff and prejudice to defendant, if the inaction has continued over a relatively long period. There is some con-
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fusion and contradiction in the rulings, due in part to the
careless use of such terms as 'laches,' 'acquiescence,' 'abandonment,' 'estoppel,' and 'waiver'.
EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Second, defenses based on circumstances external to
the parties. In this group belong the defenses of cessation of benefits, discharge of liens by judicial sale, and private necessity. When, owing to changes of any kind, plaintiff's land would derive no benefit from the enforcement of
the restriction, an injunction will not be granted, and it is
doubtful whether more than nominal damages can be recovered at law. A judicial sale does not destroy restrictions. Private necessity is no defense, though it may be of
weight in determining the proper interpretation of the restriction.
PUBLIC POLICY-IN GENERAL
Third, defenses based on public policy: the Statute of
Frauds, the Parol Evidence Rule, illegality, unreasonableness, monopoly or restraint of trade, restraints upon alienation, social policy against discriminations, and the Rule
against Perpetuities.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The Statute of Frauds applies to restrictions created as
possibilities of reverter, rights of entry, or easements, for
all these are interests in land. Whether it applies to covenants real or to equitable servitudes is theoretically doubtful, for these are considered by some authorities not to be
interests in land, but the courts might apply the Statute to
them also on grounds of convenience and uniformity irrespective of their nature. The Statute of Frauds requires a
writing signed by the party to be charged, but acceptance
of a deed seems to be held equivalent to signature. If so,
the only restrictions which the Statute would touch are
those created by oral agreement. In on!y one Pennsylvania
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case was there an oral agreement, and there the possible
application of the Statute was not noticed by the court.
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The Parol Evidence Rule has only this effect upon restrictions: that if they are set forth in a written instrument
they must stand as written. A kind of bastard Parol Evidence Rule, sometimes mentioned in opinions, to the effect
that what has been created by deed can only be varied or
released by deed, is not law.
ILLEGALITY
If compliance with a restriction would contravene a
statute or ordinance, compliance cannot be compelled so
long as the statute or ordinance is in effect.
UNREASONABI)ENESS
Restrictions must be reasonable: that is, they must not
impose a burden which brings no corresponding social benefit. But commercial considerations take care of this: unreasonable restrictions seldom or never occur.
MONOPOLY OR RESTRAINT OF TRADE
If restrictions produce a monopoly or an unreasonable
restraint of trade they are unenforceable, but "building and
use" restrictions of this character do not seem yet to have
been attempted in Pennsylvania.
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, AND SOCIAL
POLICY AGAINST DISCRIMINATIONS
An important though seldom litigated question in connection with restrictions is whether restrictions directed at
race or religion are invalid. The answer involves the rules
governing restraints on alienation and the Federal and
State Constitutions.
Such restrictions may govern transfer, or use and occupancy, or both. The rules as to restraints on alienation
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affect only transfer; but the social policies represented by
the Fourteenth Federal Amendment, and by sections one
and three of the present Constitution of Pennsylvania, apply
to use and occupancy as well as transfer. These constitutional provisions evidence a social policy against discriminations of certain kinds among citizens. The Federal provisions probably do not reach discriminations effected by
citizens in their private capacities, and supported by the
State only indirectly through judicial decisions recognizing
their validity. But to this statement one important qualification must be made. In the present state of development of the rules governing restraints on alienation, prohibitions upon transfer to persons are probably void or
valid according as they do or do not appreciably affect
marketability. In most of the United States, including
Pennsylvania, whites, or "Caucasians," greatly preponderate and negroes are in a small minority. Accordingly a
prohibition against transfer to negroes would not be an invalid restraint upon alienation, but a similar prohibition as
to whites would. This inherent inequality of effect might
be a reason for judicial declaration that privately-imposed
restraints upon transfer to negroes necessarily create a
discrimination such as the Fourteenth Federal Amendment
forbids. It may be said, then, that although restraints upon transfer directed at race are not necessarily invalid under the rules governing restraints on alienation, they may
be invalid under the Federal Constitution. But the current
of authority at present upholds them under both. These
considerations would not apply to restraints upon occupancy, for they are not subject to the rules governing restraints on alienation; and so, operating equally upon all
races, probably do not offend the Federal Constitution.
They may however offend the Constitution of Pennsylvania
by limiting the "inherent and indefeasible" right "of acquiring, possessing and protecting property."
Restraints upon transfer directed against religion have
been declared invalid under the Pennsylvania Constitution,
and the decision would be the same as to occupancy. It is

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

237

therefore unnecessary to consider their validity under the
Federal Constitution.
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
The rule against Perpetuities might well be applied to
rights of entry but probably does not apply to them in
Pennsylvania.
It cannot apply to possibilities of reverter,
or to covenants real, easements, or equitable servitudes, for
all of these are present interests.
SPENCER ERVIN.

